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Abstract
Dynamic changes in the security environment are forcing us to reﬂ ect on the shape of the 
international order at the end of the second decade of the 21st century. Th e aggressive 
policy of the Russian Federation, which is conﬁ rmed by the conﬂ ict with Georgia in 2008 
and the current situation in Ukraine, indicates that the use of military violence in the 
resolution of international disputes is not a historical category at all. Th is is of particular 
importance to the geopolitical location of the Republic of Poland. Th e length of our land 
border with the Russian Federation is 210 km, while with Belarus it is 418 km. Th e above 
fact has a fundamental impact not only on the public debate on the security of our country 
and the region, but also, and perhaps most importantly, on the shape of defence policy 
and the content of planning possible measures to prevent and counteract the escalation 
of prospective tensions in NATO-Russia relations. Both Russian military doctrine and 
the opinions expressed by politicians and specialists dealing with military issues and 
political and military experts indicate that, from the Russian perspective, the Baltic 
States’ membership of the North Atlantic Alliance and the presence of NATO troops on 
the territory of these countries, is highly unfavourable. Th erefore, there are grounds to 
believe that countries such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, are treated by Russia as 
natural bridgeheads, convenient for bringing possible strikes against Russia. Th erefore, it 
is possible that blocking communication routes leading to these countries, while cutting 
them oﬀ  from the support of allied land forces, may prove to be a key success factor in the 
situation of a hypothetical armed conﬂ ict, aimed not only at depriving these countries of 
their sovereignty, but also aimed at discrediting the power of the Alliance. 
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Introduction
Th e “Suwałki Gap”, which is the subject of this article, plays a key role in the 
problem area mentioned in the title. Th e basis for undertaking a discussion on 
the military-geographical characteristics of this area was the need to obtain 
a scientiﬁ cally justiﬁ ed answer to the research problem expressed in the form of 
the following question: what impact on military operations can be exerted by the 
military-geographical conditions speciﬁ c to the “Suwałki Gap”?
Th e need to make an eﬀ ort to solve this research problem results not only from 
the desire for scientiﬁ c cognition, but also from the need to emphasise North-
Eastern Poland’s rank (Mazury’s Operational Region) and the “Suwałki Gap” in 
contemporary geopolitical conditions. It might seem that the land connection of 
the Baltic countries from the territory of the NATO countries does not deserve 
deeper reﬂ ection. However, the growing interest in this area from Russia and 
Belarus fully conﬁ rms the legitimacy and need for further work related to the 
issues raised in this article.
Major geographical characteristics of the Masurian Operational 
Region
Th e Masurian Operational Region is part of the North-Eastern Strategic Area. 
Th e Northeast Strategic Area covers the following operational areas: the Mazurski 
Operational Region, Mazowiecki Operational Region and the Podlaski Operational 
Region. Geographically, it includes a number of macro-regions. Th ese include: the 
Gdańsk embankment, the Old Prussian Lowland, the East Baltic Lakeland, the 
Masurian Lake District, the Lithuanian Lake District, the Chełmno-Dobrzyńskie 
Lake District, the North-Azerbaijan Lowland and the North Podlaska Lowland 
(Skrzyp 1993, p. 6).
Th e terrain conditions of the Masurian Operational Region signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence 
the organisation and conduct of military activities. Th e southern sections of the 
Ełk lake district and the Koleńska Upland occupy a convenient corridor between 
the Great Masurian Lakes and the Biebrza Basin. In this area, roads leading from 
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the Kaliningrad District, through Lithuania to the centre of Poland and to Belarus 
are marked out. In addition, there are convenient facilities in them for blowing 
aerial descents from the direction of Kaliningrad region and Belarus. Larger urban 
centres of the Masurian Lake District and the Suwałki Lake District may be, in turn, 
used as independent defence zones, and the army favours their deployment in an 
interstate gap and signiﬁ cant aﬀ orestation. Th e area of  the Masurian operational 
region has long been the object of interest of many countries, especially Russia 
(the Soviet Union), Germany and Poland. Th e region provided the opportunity to 
control the southern Baltic from the bases and seaports on its east coast. After 
1945, control over the area of  the eastern Baltic Pobrze region added to the area 
of the Soviet Union, thus improving its strategic position on the Baltic Sea. It 
resulted from the need and the possibility of controlling the navigation in the 
Gulf of Gdansk and developing the attack deep into the territory of Poland and 
Lithuania. It can also be a convenient area for developing oﬀ ensive activities 
towards the middle and lower sections of the Vistula River in order to cross 
transport routes connecting Silesia and Warsaw with the Tri-City ports.
Fig. 1. North-eastern Poland (Masurian Operational Region) (Skrzyp 1993, p. 9)
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In terms of hypsometric height above sea level in the operational region, it ranges 
from 0 m on the borderline of depression to the south of Elbląg up to 309 m above 
sea level (Szeska Góra). Th e vast majority of the area extends, however, at altitudes 
from 100 to 200 m above sea level. A special feature of the area is a dense network 
of hills with a small diameter (about 100-150 m) and a relative height of up to 50 
m. Th e slopes oscillate around 2-15 points. Th e hills are arranged in latitudinal 
lengths between which there are no-way-out depressions. A characteristic feature 
of the relief is longitudinal reductions with steep, high and mostly forested slopes. 
Th e Masurian Lake District covers 10608 km2 of the discussed area, the length 
of this region from the eastern Polish border is 144 km, and the width ranges 
from 80 to 130 km. Th e average population density here is around 45-50 people 
per km2. Th e existing groups of national minorities are Ukrainians, Russians and 
Lithuanians.
Th e Staropruska lowland occupies an area of  2663 km² in the area being considered. 
It is notable for its poorly developed settlement network. Th e population density 
is around 61 people per km² for the eastern part of the lowlands, and 76 people per 
km² for the western part. Th e population density is clearly falling in the belt near 
the border with the Kaliningrad District (Obwód kaliningradzki in Wikipedia). 
Th e lake district has an abundance of inland waters, which occupy about 11% 
of its area. Th ere are numerous swamps around standing water and lakes. 
A characteristic feature of the Lake District is that the main water department 
of the Vistula and Pregoła runs through this area. In the discussed area, it visits 
the Vistula with its waters in Narew, with its right-bank tributaries, Biebrza, Pisa 
and Szkwa. Th ese rivers, in combination with lakes and canals, form a system of 
waterways of the Iława Lake District, the Great Masurian Lakes and the Augustów 
Canal.
A characteristic feature closely related to forests and lakes are the occurring sections 
of boggy terrain, especially around water reservoirs and on the isthmus between 
lakes. Th e basic obstacle to the passability is the Biebrza Basin ﬁ lled with deep peat 
deposits. In addition to the bog of the Biebrza Valley, there are numerous smaller 
swamps that ﬁ ll river valleys, the largest on the Kurpiowska Plain.
Th e whole area is dominated by loamy soils with an admixture of stones and 
gravel. Th e level of groundwater varies depending on the region and soil system, 
from 0.5 to 20 m.
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Th e forests of the discussed area are diﬃ  cult to pass due to the high density of 
rivers and lakes and channels, and a small amount of wide apertures, and in some 
areas impassable, in addition to the existing road network. Th e largest forest 
complexes of the area are the Augustów Primeval Forest, the Borecka Forest and 
forests in the vicinity of Orzysz. Th e range of visibility in forests is from 50 to 
100m. Th e stands are dominated by pine, beech and pine forests as well as spruce 
and pine forests. Th e height of the trees is 12-35 m, trunk thickness 14-45 cm. In 
spring and autumn, the softness of the soil is generally increased, worsening the 
condition of forest roads. In the summer, especially in the dry season, there is 
a threat of ﬁ res. In winter, the deciduous forest provides a minimum masking of 
troops, and moving oﬀ  the road due to snowdrifts or snow-covered rifts is usually 
diﬃ  cult. Climatic conditions can signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ect the ﬁ ght, especially in the 
conditions of precipitation, thaw and cold winter.
Th e buildings are predominantly compact in the centre, and loose outside, which 
may be conducive to the defence of the town and particularly important road 
junctions. Straight streets of hard-surfaced cities usually have a width of 6 up to 
20 m and there are currently many beltways under construction. In the event of 
an air operation being initiated by an opponent, this may involve diﬃ  culties in 
regrouping troops and occupying the centres of convenient areas of defence. Th e 
number of towns with a conventional surface area is 120 to 172, the lowest in the 
border areas. Almost seventy percent of the population live in towns with fewer 
than 200 inhabitants, of which there are around 64%.
Th e transport and communication network should ensure the eﬃ  ciency of the 
national economy functioning during peacetime as well as during a war. Th ere are 
hard roads in the discussed area, which may serve as a prognostic regrouping path 
for forces of the order of tactical connection. Th e density of the hard surface road 
network is a widely accepted measure of the development of the country’s road 
surface. In the square marked with the towns of Suwałki, Lidzbark Warmiński, 
Ciechanów, and Zambrów, there is currently no longer a section of a motorway or 
expressway. Important routes that can be used to regroup the opponent’s forces 
are: Kaunas - Suwałki - Ełk - Grajewo - Łomża; Ełk-Mrągowo - Olsztyn; Mragowo 
- Ostrołęka - Maków Mazowiecki; Białystok - Ostrołęka -Nidzica. Th e roads 
with hard surfaces are supplemented with dirt roads. Th e spatial layout of the 
area’s dirt roads is usually accidental, resulting from a multi-stage development 
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of settlement and agricultural economy. Th e railway system in the considered 
area is poorly developed with a characteristic meridian system and has one of the 
smallest density indices in the country, amounting to 6.5 km per 100 km². Main 
railway routes are: Suwałki - Augustów - Białystok, Gołdap - Ełk and Bartoszyce - 
Lidzbark Warmiński - Ostrołęka. Th e Masurian Operational District has a lack of 
airports and a shortage of convenient places to organise helicopter landing sites.
Military signifi cance of the Suwałki Region
Th e Suwałki Region mostly occupies the Suwałki Lake District. It is within the 
macroregion of the Lithuanian Lake District, part of the sub-provincial East Baltic 
Lakeland. Th e southern part of the macroregion is occupied by the mesoregion of the 
Augustów Plain, and the East Suscepture Lake District extends to the north (Kondracki 
1998, p. 27). Th e area is mostly wooded (partly the Augustów Primeval Forest), 
with the highest elevation reaching up to 300 m above sea level. Such a terrain with 
250 lakes makes it, from the point of view of conducting combat operations, a forested 
area convenient for conducting irregular activities and also other types of combat, 
especially all forms of defence, delaying or special actions (Bujak 2000, p. 69).
During the defensive war in September 1939, in the Suwałki region, as a dead-end 
in operational terms, no large-scale combat operations were carried out, and just 
a few reconnaissance raids on the territory of East Prussia on the orders of the 
Commander of the Suwałki Cavalry Brigade General Brig. Zygmunt Podhorski 
were carried out. Th e Brigade was withdrawn from occupied defensive positions 
in the Suwalki region on the night of 4th/5th September. In its place, the units of the 
Border Protection Corps were introduced, including the newly formed 3rd KOP 
regiment, the 24th Bureau of the KOP “Sejny” and the company of the Border 
Guards District “Suwałki”, which took over the responsibility for the defensive 
section of Augustów. However, these units, as a result of the unfavourable strategic 
situation on the front and orders from the Supreme Commander, soon left their 
defensive positions. On the eve of Soviet aggression on Poland on September 
16, the 24th Battalion of KOP “Sejny”, commanded by Lt. Col. Michał Osmola 
together with the Suwalki sub-units of the Border Guard were the last remaining 
in the Suwalki region. Since that time, no military branches have been in Suwałki 
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or throughout the poviat. Th e battalion took part in heavy ﬁ ghting on September 
21-23 with Soviet troops in Sopoćkini, near Kalety and on the Augustów Canal, 
shielding the retreat of Polish troops to Lithuania (Kowalski 1999, pp. 206-237). 
Opposing the Kopists was the Mechanised Group of the 27th Armored Brigade, 
targeting the Suwałki Region. Th e battalion fought the hardest battalions at 
Sopoćkiniami and near the town of Kodziowce, providing support to the 101st 
Uhlans regiment (Grzelak and Kozłowski 1994, p. 53). After three days of ﬁ ghting 
on the night of September 23/24, Lt Col Osmola led the battalion to Lithuania. 
Before crossing the border, most of the combat equipment was hidden in selected 
localities in the Augustów Forest. Th is was justiﬁ ed because it was a border region 
protected from 1926 by a battalion. Many of the interned soldiers of the PEC in 
Lithuania later, entered the West through Riga as part of the re-forming Polish 
Army or returned to the country, including the creator of the underground in the 
Suwałki region, cpt. Marian Świtalski.
In the area abandoned by the civilian authorities and the army of Suwałki, the 
protection of public facilities for the safety of residents was taken up by the law 
enforcement service organised on the initiative of the valued Suwałki attorney and 
social worker of Bonaventure Lutostanski (Polskieradio.pl 2011). Th e inhabitants 
used the period of hostile occupation to hide souvenirs and national symbols.
Fig. 2. Variant of the direction of impact in order to occupy the “Suwałki Gap” 
(Dubiński 2015)
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Despite the fact that, in 1939, the area of  Suwałki region was not an area of 
more serious struggles, its importance in the aspect of potential military use 
remains important. Th e speciﬁ c location between the enclave of Russia and its 
favourable Belarus forces highlights the role and the place of this area in the plans 
and defensive concepts of Poland and the Alliance. According to experts dealing 
with defence and security issues, the Baltic states may constitute a viable goal of 
Russia’s action, serving the purpose of discrediting NATO as a whole. Th e seizure 
of the “Suwałki gap” could turn out to be a proﬁ table activity for Russia, which 
the West does not expect (Figure 2). Th at is why it is so important to carry out 
the related considerations and plan appropriate pre-emptive actions, aimed at 
discouraging the potential aggressor to undertake military actions. Th e allied 
assumptions related to securing NATO’s eastern ﬂ ank are an excellent example of 
this. Th e leading nature of such activities seems to be a key determinant of their 
success. Th ey cannot, however, be a response to the opponent’s actions, but have 
an active character, aimed at overtaking a potential aggressor. While this seems 
to be possible in a national approach, it can be very diﬃ  cult in allied conditions. 
In reference to securing the “Suwałki gap”, it may be necessary to introduce a new 
strategic category to military practice preventive and anticipatory-deterrence 
projects. Within their framework, actions such as: deterring, overtaking an 
opponent, information domination, domination in space and cyber space, and 
the ability to ﬁ ght separatist movements, may be applied. Th e above-mentioned 
approach based on the results of scientiﬁ c research is a response to threats that 
may be characteristic of the beginning of the 21st century, which may also occur 
in relation to the “Suwałki gap”. Th is approach, however, requires further detailed 
research leading to the negation or conﬁ rmation of the undoubtedly questionable 
assumptions.
Characteristics of the “Suwałki Gap”
Th roughout the interwar period in the border area of Suwalki region, the length 
of the boundary line of Germany extended over 78 km, and of Lithuania 105 km. 
Th e length of the poviat base (southern border of the Augustowski district) was 
95 km and was proceeded over its entire area by Augustowski Forest (Buczyński 
1991, p. 6). Th e total length of the Suwałki county borders was 276 km, of which 
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2/3 coincided with the border of the Polish state. It is a speciﬁ c border location, 
somehow in the shape of a peninsula surrounded on three sides by German 
borders and Lithuania which meant that it can often be found described as the 
“Suwalki protrusion” or “ Suwalki sack” (Paraﬁ anowicz 2015, p. 15).
In view of the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation, the term “Suwalki gap” 
recently became popular, referring to the areas located around Suwalki, Augustow 
and Sejny, constituting a combination of the territory of the Baltic states with 
Poland and the rest of the NATO countries and those separating the territory of 
the Kaliningrad region and Belarus (Fig. 3) (Przesmyk suwalski in Wikipedia). 
Geographically, the area is a macroregion called the Lithuanian Lake District. 
However, from the point of view of military-geographical division of Polish 
territory, the “Suwalki gap” forms a section of the Masurian Region Operational 
component of the North-East Strategic Area.
Fig. 3. Graphic illustration of the “Suwałki gap” (Rogacin 2015)
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Th e “Suwałki gap” covers parts of the Romnicka Forest, the Zachodniosuwalski 
Lake District, the Wschodniosuwalskie Lake District and the Augustów Plain, 
from the Masurian Lake District it is separated by the Rospuda Valley. Th is area 
is notable for its varied terrain, with relative heights oscillating between 20 and 
300 m. Th ere are both high post-glacial hills and deep gutters (e.g. Lake Hańcza 
- 108 m). On the Augustów Plain, the land falls gently towards the Biebrza Basin 
(from 190 m in the area of  Suwałki to 130 m in the area of  Augustów).
Th e climatic conditions of the area under consideration have continental features. 
Th e average temperature at the beginning of the year is -4.4°C (reaching -30°C), in 
summer 17.4°C (maximum 34.9°C). Th e maximum rainfall falls in July (206mm). 
Th e lowest temperatures usually occur from December to mid-March, the snow 
persists until mid-April.
In the “Suwałki Isthmus” there are diverse, clayey soils in the northern part, 
sand in the south, and bogs both in the north (Puszcza Romnicka) and in the 
south (Puszcza Augustowska). Th e conditions for running the ﬁ eld fortiﬁ cation 
construction are convenient. All engineering work can be done by hand as well as 
using earthmoving machines.
In the considered area, forests are unevenly distributed. Most aﬀ orestation is 
part of the Augustów Primeval Forest, covering areas east of Suwałki, up to the 
state border. Th e Romnicka Forest stretches northwards, growing on the Polish-
Lithuanian-Russian border.
Inland waters occupy about 3% of the described area. Larger clusters of lakes 
are located in the vicinity of Augustów and east of Suwałki. In the remaining 
part of the “Suwałki Isthmus”, the lakes occur less frequently, ﬁ lling in principle 
gutters, into which also ﬂ ow rivers (Rospuda, Czarna Hańcza), connecting with 
the Augustów Canal. Th e Zachodniosuwalskie Lakeland is dominated by small 
gutter-type lakes located in the glacial rivers of the Rospuda, Przerośl and Rivers 
Jarka (a small tributary of Gołdap).
In the basin of Jarka, on the extension of the Rospuda river gutter, is the Black 
Lake, which has an outﬂ ow to Lake Garbaś. In turn, in the Wschodniosuwalskie 
Lakeland, are mainly gutter lakes located in postglacial gutters, which are 
connected with each other by numerous rivers.
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In the lake districts is Poland’s deepest lake - Hańcza, and Lake Wigry (half located 
within the Augustów Plain). On the Augustów Plain, the lakes are concentrated 
around Augustów and in the area of  the southern part of Lake Wigry. Th e Augustów 
Lakes are connected to each other by the Augustów Canal. Morphometric data of 
selected lakes is included in Table 1.
Lake name Area(ha)
Capacity
(thousand 
of m3)
Average 
depth (m)
Max. 
length 
(m)
Max. 
width 
(m)
Length of 
shore line (m)
West-Suwałki Lake District
Czarne 172,2 17116,8 9,9 3750 1020 10650
Rospuda 341,7 49731,8 14,5 5800 850 13650
Mieruńskie 
Wlk.
189,4 12717,9 6,7 3950 925 11250
Garbaś 152,5 31809,7 20,9 3450 730 8300
Oleckie Wlk. 227,3 37912,5 16,7 4860 1110 10950
Bolesty 138,8 9716,4 7,0 5800 450 12150
East-Suwałki Lake District
Hańcza 311,4 120364,1 38,7 4525 1175 11750
Szelment Mł. 168,5 12577,3 7,5 3535 1005 9525
Szelment Wlk. 356,1 53492,0 15,0 6250 1125 19100
Gałduś 728,6 92474,7 12,7 10600 1500 26925
Wigry 2118,3 336726,7 15,8 17500 3550 72225
Augustow Plain
Blizno 238,5 24191,1 10,0 4900 750 12325
Serwy 460,3 67181,5 14,6 6900 1100 20250
Necko 400,0 40561,4 10,1 5400 850 13000
Białe 476,6 41716,5 8,7 5950 1200 18650
Sajno 522,5 52446,8 10,0 7100 1050 15050
Table 1. Morphometric data of selected lakes of the “Suwałki Shed”
Th e region is notable for its not very dense settlement network. Th e main centres 
here are Suwałki and Augustów. Th e industry is underdeveloped, agriculture, 
forestry and tourism dominate. Th e construction of villages, from several to several 
dozen farms, is loose, with a signiﬁ cant number of isolated farms. Communication 
is not well developed, the main road junctions are the already mentioned Suwałki 
and Augustów. Th ey are local in nature, although there is a constant increase in 
their importance (e.g. construction of the Via Baltica road) (Generalna Dyrekcja 
Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad 2017).
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Th e “Suwałki gap” is a convenient region for multidirectional activities into 
Central and Eastern Europe. Th ere is also a so-called “August’s junction” through 
which there are communication routes leading from Poland to Lithuania and 
the main railway line connecting Poland with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Th e 
importance of the region is also conﬁ rmed by the exercise scenarios in which 
Russia deﬁ nes this direction as convenient for impacting.
Slaughter cover as a prospective military action area?
Th e results of the research presented in the earlier part of this article indicate that 
although the area of  the “Suwałki Isthmus” was not a place of more serious military 
clashes in the past, in the current geopolitical conditions, this possibility cannot be 
ruled out. In view of the above, the results of research on the hypothetical threats 
posed by a potential opponent of the Alliance and adequate counter scenarios 
related to securing the area under consideration will be presented below.
Th e Kaliningrad Oblast is an enclave of the Russian Federation, isolated from the 
rest of the territory of this country. Th e only connection of the Oblast with Russia is 
by sea. Th e length of the land border between Poland and the Kaliningrad District 
is 210 km. It has an artiﬁ cial character and runs parallel to the Pregoła River. 
Th e naval forces of the Russian Federation stationed in the Kaliningrad region 
have a favourable starting base for the possible blockade of the Gulf of Gdansk 
and control of maritime transport routes connecting Polish ports with ports of 
countries such as Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. In relation to 
the Russian land forces stationed in the Oblast, it can be successfully assumed 
that they have favourable conditions to make an impact towards Poland (along 
the lower Vistula) in order to block the Tri-City ports from the land and cut oﬀ  
communication between the centre of the country and the north. It is also possible 
to use these forces to develop oﬀ ensive operations towards the south and create 
a threat to Warsaw from the north-west (Skrzyp 1999, p. 70). Th e proximity of 
the Kaliningrad region with Lithuania is also not without signiﬁ cance. It cuts the 
strategic space of Russia and Belarus, thus limiting the freedom of communication 
in the immediate vicinity of our country.
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Th e lack of natural terrain barriers on the Polish-Russian and Polish-Belarusian 
borders favours conducting oﬀ ensive operations towards our country in two 
corridors, converging in the centre of Poland. Potential directions of activities 
from the territory of the Kaliningrad District and Belarus cover about 25% of the 
area of  the Republic of Poland, along with Warsaw. Th is puts our country in an 
unfavourable position, which is somewhat altered by the neighborhood of Poland 
and Lithuania, which, as mentioned earlier, cuts the strategic space of Russia 
(Skrzyp and Lach 2008, p. 104).
Fig. 4. Convenient directions for developing offensive activities in north-eastern 
Poland (Skrzyp 1993, p. 52) 
In light of the above research results, selected specialists dealing with defence 
and security issues recognise the “Suwałki Isthmus” as a highly ﬂ ammable point 
in Europe. In October 2015, American General Frederick Benjamin “Ben” Hodges 
described the borderland of Poland and Lithuania as well as the Donbas region as the 
most endangered areas on the continent. Hodges also underlined the visible growth 
of Russian military investments in the Kaliningrad District, while emphasising 
the development of nuclear potential (wPolityce.pl, 2015). Also signiﬁ cant is the 
statement of former adviser to Vladimir Putin, Andrei Ilyarionov, who said that 
the decision on Russian intervention to the west has already been made. In his 
opinion, Russia’s aggression towards the Baltic States and Poland is only a matter 
of time (wPolityce.pl, 2015). Th erefore, there are serious grounds to believe that 
if Russia takes measures aimed at occupying the Baltic States, the “Suwałki gap” 
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may be a convenient direction for bringing an auxiliary strike towards Poland 
(Figure 4) after they are conquered. Th is assumption is of course hypothetical and 
should not cause excessive anxiety. A factor increasing the level of risk associated 
with possible Russian aggression is that the Baltic States have a signiﬁ cant Russian 
minority, whose rights in the opinion of the authorities in Moscow are not duly 
respected (Dudzińska 2012, p. 2636). Experiences related to the heating of conﬂ icts 
caused in recent years by the Russian Federation indicate that a strict condition 
for their commencement was strictly deﬁ ned, favourable conditions. It does not 
seem, however, that in the event of military intent against the Baltic States, such 
a condition would be to block the “Suwałki gap” as a transit route enabling for 
NATO support to those countries. However, an important factor may be the internal 
instability of NATO, which may be expressed by the lack of unanimity regarding 
the provision of tangible support to endangered allies. Th erefore, the key premise 
for ensuring security may be the Alliance’s defensive and integrative cohesion as 
well as consistency in emphasising the premises of NATO unanimity. A signiﬁ cant 
factor escalating the threats from Russia is the increase of nationalist moods in 
some European countries, the domination of national interests or questioning the 
meaning of European integration. An additional risk factor may also be a reduction 
in American involvement in guaranteeing the security of European NATO countries 
and the disintegration of the European Union.
Taking into account the above-mentioned research results, it can be concluded 
that there is an awareness of the signiﬁ cance of the social background of 
contemporary military confrontations among Russian military theoreticians. 
Conﬁ rmation of this assumption is the signiﬁ cant activity in this country of 
paramilitary and military formations, established with a view to their use for 
suppressing social disturbances, terrorist acts or border incidents. Th e choice 
of regions and scenarios for conducting military maneuvers deserves attention. 
Th ey usually take place near NATO’s borders and have an oﬀ ensive character. 
An example of this is the exercise of Russian airborne troops in the Pskov region, 
preparing for landing in the border area of  Latvia and Estonia, and Russian and 
Belarusian troop exercises near Brest. Every year, in Russia, there are several 
thousand polygon exercises at all levels, and there were over three thousand in 
2014 (tvn24). Available research results, however, indicate that the prospect of 
a prospective operating environment will be dominated by hybrid threats targeted 
at vulnerable points of the armed forces and critical infrastructure of states 
17
Security and Defence Quarterly 2017; 17(4) Ryszard Parafi anowicz
constituting the object of aggression (Banasik and Paraﬁ anowicz 2015, p. 9). It is 
also worth mentioning that the threat posed by the Russian Federation is not only 
due to the rank of its military potential. Th e following factors are also important: 
paramilitary organisations, the level of armaments of the armed forces, education 
of the commanding staﬀ  and soldiers’ morale, logistics facilities, army mobility, 
intelligence and counterintelligence as well as the armaments industry. What is 
disturbing is the fact that these components constitute a combined system (Ścibiorek 
2017, p. 31). Th us, only a systemic approach to the problem of threats from Russia 
can bring tangible conclusions in the form of rational (hypothetical) scenarios of 
the operation of its armed forces towards Poland or other NATO countries.
As already indicated earlier, the “Suwałki gap” in military-geographical terms is 
not a convenient area for military action. Th e principles of martial art explicitly 
deny the validity of leading an attack in such a territory. It seems, therefore, that 
the opponent will seek to implement a diﬀ erent scenario.
Due to the aggressive intentions of the Russian Federation towards the Baltic 
States, it cannot be excluded that their territories can be controlled in such a way 
as to make ground communication with the Alliance area impossible via the 
“Suwałki gap”. Th erefore, it is important to build a military advantage in the Baltic 
Sea region and maintain the required potential to deter the potential aggressor 
not only in the land dimension, but above all in air, sea and cyber space. Th is does 
not diminish the importance of the deployment of NATO forces in the area of  the 
“Suwałki gap” and in the Baltic States. Despite the fact that their combat potential 
is not suﬃ  cient to defend the entire theatre of war activities, their presence, 
according to politicians, is a credible deterrent (wPolityce.pl, 2016). However, the 
approach to the functioning of allied military structures and political processes to 
create a coherent and credible deterrence strategy requires rethinking. Decisions 
taken at the NATO summit in Warsaw may be treated by selected countries of 
Western Europe as a suﬃ  cient political signal to Russia, requiring no further steps. 
Th e most negative scenario may be an attempt to discredit the decisions of the 
NATO summit in the next few years. It seems that the key position in this respect 
may be the position of the United States, which after an unsuccessful attempt 
to reset relations with Russia will probably strive to maintain its presence at the 
eastern borders of the Alliance in order to prevent Russia from hypothetically 
attacking NATO member states.
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Conclusions
Th e results of the research presented in the non-minor article indicate that, 
despite the fact that the area of  the “Suwałki gap” was not an arena of signiﬁ cant 
military clashes in the past, it is not possible to exclude such a possibility in the 
foreseeable future. At the same time, it seems that securing the region under 
consideration against potential aggression from a potential opponent requires 
a broader view of the problem under consideration. We are talking not only 
about the preventive deployment of NATO forces, but also about a number of 
political and diplomatic undertakings. Military-geographical conditions of the 
“Suwałki gap” in themselves do not make it a “desirable” region for the opponent. 
In military terms, it can possibly be used as an auxiliary course of action; however, 
in the wider perspective (from the point of view of the Alliance’s defence policy) it 
becomes of political, military and propaganda signiﬁ cance. It cannot be ruled out 
that a potential opponent will consider the possibility of armed aggression against 
a NATO member state, but this scenario seems unlikely at present. Undoubtedly, 
such action will be preceded by undertakings aimed at creating favourable 
conditions (social, political or military). With this approach, the idea of Russia 
seizing the “Suwałki gap” in the near future seems doubtful.
It is also worth noting that the aggressive military actions of the Russian Federation 
have never been directed at a NATO member state. Of course, there have been 
ventures aimed at disorganising selected elements of NATO countries’ critical 
infrastructure countries (cyberattack on servers of Estonian state institutions 
in 2007), but the attackers have never been clearly deﬁ ned. And it is cybernetic 
space that is currently seen as a place of clashes between parties (state entities) 
with opposing interests.
Th e deployment of Russian forces in the Kaliningrad region, which is adjacent to 
Poland, should undoubtedly be seen as a hypothetical threat. However, their use 
for blocking the “Suwałki gap” remains doubtful. Th is is contradicted not only 
by the contemporary military-political conditions, but also, and perhaps above 
all, by the geographical conditions of north-eastern Poland that have remained 
unchanged for years.
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